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The Supreme Court of New York has very properly decided (especially in view of the fact that the defendant was an
Assignment attorney-at-law) that proofs that the plaintiff knew
of Judgment, the nature and effect of an assignment of a judgFalse Repre- ment, does not meet the plaintiff's charge that he
sentation
was induced to make said assignment to the defendant by reason of a false representation on the part of the
latter, that if the plaintiff did not so do he would be sent to
prison: Dunn v. Wehle, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 98 1.
The Kansas Statute (§ 42, c. 6 Gen. Stat. 1889) provides
that on the day of executing an assignment, a schedule of the
Assignment liabilities of the assignor shall be filed with the
for Benefit of clerk of the court, whose duty it becomes to notify
Creditors
the creditors. In Goodin v. Newcomb, 49 Pac. 821
(Kan.), the court was called upon to decide the validity of an
assignment where the schedule was not filed until the following day, as against an attachment which issued just after the
filing of the schedule: it was held that the assignment was
completed by the filing of the schedule, although it was intimated that the attachment might have been given priority if
there had been any evidence that the schedule was withheld
for a fraudulent purpose.
An attorney has, by virtue of his office, no authority to
compromise his client's claim, or to satisfiy his client's judgment, except upon payment in full. Hence, held
Attorney,
8cope of
that burden is on party who alleges that plaintifi's
Authority
attorney accepted an acknowledgment of indebtedness by garnishee to debtor in payment of his writ of execution, to show that he had authority to do so: Barrv. Roder,
49 Pac. (Ore.) 962.
The question of the validity of an auction sale at which
puffers are employed by the owner to bid up prices in his
Auction sale, behalf, about which the courts of common law and
Validity
of equity in England were so long a time at variance, has been recently passed upon by the Supreme Court of
New York, that court holding that such sale operates as a
fraud on the real bidders and is invalid: Bowman v. McClenauan, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 945.
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A broker is entitled to his commission for the sale of real
estate as soon as he has found a purchaser, regardless of whether
his principal throws over the contract or not, but
Broker,
the broker may waive his right by continuing to
Rimt to
Commission

act for the principal and selling it to another pur-

chaser, when he is entitled to commission only on second sale:
Deford v. Skepard, 49 Pac. (Kan.) 795.
A form of notice sent by a common carrier to the consignee of certain goods, apprising the latter of the fact that
the said goods had arrived at their destination, and
Common
Carriers;
Delivery of
Good,
Evidence of

bearing a request to return said notice when call-

ing to pay charges, and a statement that all orders

for the delivery of goods must give the number
Title Thereto of the car and date of freight bill, is not evidence

of title of said goods sufficient to justify a delivery to the
party in whose hands the paper is found, without ascertaining that the delivery was being made to the consignee: Sinsheimer v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. Suppl.
887. (Supreme Court.)
Defendant acted as attorney for plaintiff and others in the
adjustment of certain fire insurance. Plaintiff claimed a balConfidential

ommunication,

ance due her upon this account. Defence that
this balance had been paid over to other parties,

clients of defendant, with the plaintiff's consent.

Attorney and When asked to state their names defendant refused,
Client
on the ground that such payment was a confiden-

tial communication. It was decided when an attorney acts for
several, a communication made by or to one of them in the
presence or with the knowledge of the others is not a confidential communication, and hence defendant must answer the
question: Minard v. Stillman, 49 Pac. (Ore.) 976.
The Supreme Court of New York has reiterated the rule that
in the case of a contract consummated through written correContract,
Place of
Making

spondence, the contract is made at the place where

the letter containing the proposition is received and
whence the assenting reply is forwarded, and that
the contract is complete when the letter of acceptance is sent;
and applying the rule to wagering contracts, has decreed
a recovery under the New York Statute, (i Rev. St., p. 663,
§§ 15, i6,) of money transmitted by the plaintiff in New York
to the defendant in Pittsburg, Pa., to be used by the latter in
wagering contracts upon the rise and fall of prices on the
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Chicago Board of Trade: Zeitner v. Irwin,46 N. Y. Suppl. 852.
When in a contract for the sale of real estate the person
named as vendee refuses to carry out the agreement unless
Performance, property not mentioned in the contract is conveyed
to him, the vendor is relieved from performance, or
Tender of
tender of performance, as a prerequisite to recovering an
amount named in the contract as liquidated damages: Lighthall v. M Guire, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 987. (Supreme Court.)
Where the seller of grain, prior to the time of delivery,
notifies the buyer that he will not deliver the property purchased; if, at any time between the notice of reBreach,
Damages
scission and the time of delivery, the buyer might
have bought in the market at or below the contract price, he
can only recover nominal damages; but if, during that period,
the market value is constantly greater than the contract price,
the buyer need not purchase in the market at his peril, at the
time when the value is lowest, nor, indeed, at all, but may
recover from the defaulting seller the market value of the
grain at the time and place of delivery, less the contract price:
York-Draper Mercantile Co. v. Lusk, (Court of Appeals of Kansas,) 49 Pac. Rep. 788.
The rule that the defendant, in a suit for breach of contract,
is not liable for speculative damages, does not extend so far as
Speculative to permit him to escap~all liability for the breach
Damages
simply because his liability cannot be accurately
determined in dollars and cents, and the jury may thus need
to speculate somewhat as to the amount of damages suffered
by the plaintiff: Stowell v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. Suppl.
802. (Supreme Court.)
The Supreme Court of New York, in Williams v. Hay, 46
N. Y. Supp. 895, decided that it was not actionable deceit for
an insolvent to give a guarantee for the performDeceit,
Guaranty of ance of a third person's contract, where he neither
Insolvent,
represents himself to be solvent nor discloses the
Fact not
Disclosed
fact of his insolvency.
This follows out the rule that an intent to defraud cannot
be imputed to an insolvent, who contracts a debt knowing he
is insolvent, but not disclosing the fact.
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 provides that, when a
British seaman is discharged, the master shall furnish his passage home, or supply him with the means of
Discharged
Seamen,
reaching home, or else "deposit with the conPassage Home sular officer . . . such a sum of money as is by
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the officer . . . deemed sufficient to defray the expenses of
his maintenance and passage home." The penalty for noncompliance is liability to a suit by the seaman for the expenses incurred. The Court of Appeal has decided (Edwards v. Steel, Young & Co., 45 Weekly Rep. 689) that if
the master deposits with the consular officer money for this
purpose, that officer is arbitrator without appeal, and a seaman whose expenses exceed the amount thus deposited has
no remedy.
Under the New York Statute alimony may be allowed or
increased after divorce, provided the court reserves the power in the decree of divorce: Noble
v. Noble, 46 N.Y. Supp. 820. (Supreme Court.)
Divorce,
Alimony

The Supreme Court of New York has laid down the rule
that an election to decide the question of the issuance of municipal bonds, on which question only qualified
Elections,
Qualified
property owners are by statute allowed to vote, is
Voters
rendered void by the admission of unqualified votes
to a number equal to the majority by which the proposition
was carried: Scott v. Twombly, 46 N. Y. Suppl. io84.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has reaffirmed the rule
already established both in England and in the United States,
Eligibility of that votes cast by legal voters for an ineligible
candidate, it not affirmatively appearing that said
Candidate,
Rejection of voters knew the candidate to be ineligible, are not
Ballots
to be rejected in determining whether the opposing
candidate has received a majority of the votes cast: State ex
rel. Goodell v. McGeary, 38 At]. Rep. 165.
For one person t6 induce another to leave an employment
or to discharge an employe by persuasion or argument, however whimsical, unreasonable or absurd, is not in
Employe,
Unlawful itself unlawful, but to intimidate an employer by
Procurement threats, if the threats are of a character to proof Discharge, duce this result, and thereby cause him to discharge an employe whom he desired to retain and would have
retained except for such unlawful threats, is an actionable
wrong: Perkins v. Pendleton, 38 Atl. Rep. (Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine), 96.
In suit for damages to rental value of property by reason of
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the construction and operation of elevated railroad, plaintiff's
experts testified to the general course and current
Evidence,
of values in the neighborhood. On cross-examiCrossExamination, nation they were asked questions as to the change
in rental value of specific properties. Held to be
Collateral
On opening of defendant's case he
proper.
Facts
offered testimony of experts as to specific prices of property
to contradict the statements made by plaintiff's witnesses on
cross-examination, and thus prove that they had not sufficient
knowledge to render their testimony of any weight. Held
inadmissible: O'Sullivan. et al. v. N. Y E. R. R., (Supreme
Court.) 46 N. Y. Suppl. 764.
Indictment for murder. When deceased was in extremis, the
prisoner and a co-defendant, Wong Wing, were brought before
him. Wonj Wing on entering made a remark to
deceased in Chinese. In the course of the dying
Dying
Declaration

declaration, which was then being written down
for deceased; the district attorney asked what Wong Wing had
said to him on entering. Held inadmissible: People v. Wong
Chuey, (California,) 49 Pac. 834.
In the Circuit Court, Northern District of California, Morrow, Circuit Judge, has recently decided the following question of jurisdiction :
A firm residing and carrying on business in New York
brought an action at law against the city of Santa Rosa, State
of California, upon bonds, with interest coupons,
Federal Court,
Prior to the rendition of
Jurisdiction, issued by said city.
to in-a
applied
judgment
Ancillry
he was
the ground that
tervene in the
thatpresent
suit, on complainant
Bill in
Equity to
Enjoin Action
at Law In

SaId Court

resident and taxpayer of the city and desired to
resist payment of the bonds; that they were illegal, and a proper defence was not being made.

His motion was dismissed. Thereupon the complainant filed
a bill in equity to enjoin the action at law and to obtain
leave to intervene and defend. It was objected that the
court had no jurisdiction, as the complainant and the city of
Santa Rosa were both citizens of California. The court held
that when a bill in equity is brought in the Circuit Court to
enjoin and impeach the judgment rendered by a state court,
the jurisdictional requisite of diversity of citizenship must
exist. In this respect the suit is deemed an original, independent suit. But the present bill having been brought to
enjoin a judgment in the United States Court, where the jurisdictional requisite of diversity, of citizenship was satisfied, was
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not an independent suit, but ancillary to that action. It could,
therefore, be maintained.
The court, however, decided against the complainant on
the ground that the previous ruling in the action of law, that
Pes
his status as a taxpayer was not sufficient to enJul¢Cata
title him to intervene, was applicable and conclusive against his right in the suit in equity-the ruling
having remained without appeal or reversal: McDonald v.
Seligman, 8I Fed. Rep. 753.
Cunningham v. Syracuse Improvement Co., 46 N. Y. Supp.
954, (Supreme Court,) is a fresh illustration of the old principle that in determining the question whether one
Fellowservants, is a servant of another, so as to make the other
Test of
responsible for his work to strangers, and so as to
Relation
exempt the other from liability to the one for the
work of the other's servants, the sole test is whether the one
is employed by the other and subject to his direction and control. If so, the relationship, with its legal consequences,
exists, and it matters not that the servant is in the general
employ of another, and only temporarily loaned for the occasion: Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248 (1893), and Mclnery
v. Canal Co., 151 N. Y. 411 (1896), are cited as settling any
doubt about the New York rule.
In Mullane v. Houston, W. St. & P. F. R. Co., id. 957, it
was held that a trackmaster of a cable road company represents the company, and that one who is injured while obeying
his orders and relying on his promise to avert danger, has a
cause of action against the company.
An interesting case on this ever interesting question is
Cerrillos Coal]R. Co. v. Deserant, 49 Pac. (N. M.) 807. PlainContributory tiff's intestate had been killed in a coal mine by
Negligence
an explosion of gas; there was evidence that the
room in which the gas had collected had been marked dangerous by the fire-boss, who was admitted to be a vice principal. The judgment for plaintiff was reversed, on the ground
that the attention, of the jury had not been directed to the
defendant's legal position, which the Supreme Court now approves: to wit, that if deceased had seen the dangerous signal,
and had in spite -of it gone on with his work in an adjoining
room, he was guilty of contributory negligence, and plaintiff
could not recover, especially as the accident could only have
taken place through the negligence and disobedience of a
fellow-servant : Sullivan v. Manufacturing Co., I 13 Mass. 396
(1874); Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S.-368 (1892), are
followed.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

Just what degree of affixing to real estate is necessary to
constitute machinery part of the real estate, for the purpose
of subjecting it to a mortgage in which it is not
. Fixturs,
Transfer with expressly mentioned, was the question raised and
Mortgage to be decided in Dainler Motor Co. v. Bowen, 41
Solic. Journ. 778. The case was presented in the form of ar
injunction, prayed for by both mortgagor and mortgagee, to.
prevent a subsequent vendor from selling the machinery..
Security being given by plaintiffs, the machinery was delivered to them pending trial. It will be interesting to watcl
the result.
Ekstrom v. Hall,38 Atl. (Me.) 1o6, decides that fixtures annexed to realty after execution of mortgage become part of*
the security, and cannot be removed without mortgagee's.
consent.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently decided that if
a foreign corporation does business in a state, it renders itself
subject to service of process upon its officers or
Foreign
Corporations, agents in that state, and this, too, where there is
Service of no special provision to that effect in the laws of
the state. The court said: "Now, by the laws
Process
and policy of this state, foreign corporations are as free to.
engage in business therein as corporations of its own creation;
but, no special provision having been made for the service ofprocess upon them . . . .itmay be made in like manner as.
upon domestic corporations, and a return thereof, good in an:
action against the latter, will, under similar circumstances be
good against the former." It is believed that the court was
in error: St. Clairv. Cox, io6 U. S. 350 (1882); upon which
the court relies does not support this view. That case holds
that a state may declare, as a condition of a corporation's
doing business within its borders, that the corporation shall be
liable to service of process, and that that condition may be
implied as well as expressed. For, "if a state permits a
foreign corporation to do business within her limits, and at the
same time provides that in suits against it for business there
done, process shall be served upon its agents, the provision is
to be deemed a condition of the permission." The court, in
the present case, implies not only the condition but also the
statute imposing it: Farrel v. Oregon Gold-Min. Co., 49 Pac.
Rep. 876.
An action for money had and received, (McClure v. Law,
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46 N. Y. Supp. 775.) recently brought to light the details of
a fraudulent scheme to gain control of an insurFraud of
ance corporation.
Drector,
Money had
The defendant and other members of the board
ad Receved contracted to sell the management of the company to one Levy for the sum of $15,ooo, and, in accordance
with their agreement, resigned their offices from time to time
as he requested, substituting in their places his nominees. The
purchaser made good use of his bargain, and succeeded in
thoroughly depleting the treasury of the once prosperous
concern. The action against the defendant was based on the
theory that, in receiving the bribe he had taken money belonging to the company; but the Supreme Court of New
York reversed the verdict against him, on the ground that
his act was one which the corporation could not have authorized or ratified, and, therefore, it could not be considered
that he had acted as its agent.
Connecticut Bank v. Bolton, 46 N. Y. Supp. 734, (Supreme
Court,) simply reiterates the old rule that bonafide transfers of
Fraudulent property by a debtor before insolvency to pay his
Conveyances just debts will be sustained, unless the creditor has
entered upon a fraudulent arrangement with the debtor intended to hinder and delay other creditors.
It is familiar law that a fraudulent grantee of property of an
insolvent debtor who pays no consideration is bound to account
for the same to the insolvent's creditors, whose
remedy is by bill in equity. A neat application of
Bill In
this principle was made in Sabin v. Anderson, 49
Pac. 870 (Oregon.) Anderson before failing left certain promissory notes, aggregating $6500, payable to his order with a
banker, Lively, who gave him a certificate forthis amount, knowing that his purpose was to conceal the notes from his creditors ; subsequently, Lively, fearing that the certificate would
be endorsed to an innocent holder, indirectly purchased it
Held (i) Lively was liable to
from Anderson for $28o0.
Anderson's creditors for amount of notes; (2) as the $28oo
was'paid not to restore the property but to protect himself, he
is entitled to no deduction therefor; (3) creditor's right to resort to bill in equity is not taken away by statutory proceeding
by attachment, which is not an adequate and complete remedy.
A guardian is entitled, by virtue of his appointment, to the
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custody of his ward's estate, consequently an order of court,
authorizing him to claim a deposit, "only as
Guardian,
Authority authorized by this court," is invalid. If the court
of Court
should assume to determine the propriety of the
guardian's proposed dealings, it would be usurping his place.
ln re Welch's Estate, no Cal. 605 (1896), where the same
principle is applied to a court's interference With an administor's duties, followed: De Greayer v. Superior Court of City
and County of San Francisco,49 Pac. (Cal.) 983.
Zn re Bolton, 46 N. Y. Supp. 9o8, (Supreme Court,) decides
(i) a guardian has no right to invest his ward's personalty in
real estate, and if he does so, the ward can elect
Guardian,
Power to whether he will take the realty or demand an
Invest

accounting of personalty;

(2) if authorized by

court to so invest, the realty remains personalty, and will pass
as personalty under the intestate laws or the infant's will.
A guardian's duty is personal, and terminates with his
death; his sureties are responsible for his faithful administraGuardian,

Death of,
Liability of

Sureties

tion and for the production to the new guardian
of the ward of the estate unimpaired at the
guardian's death. They are not, however, entitled to possession of the estate at the time of

his death, and are under no duty to administer the sameGarrettv. Reese, 27 S. E. (Ga.) 750.

Transactions between .husband and wife, by
which either's
creditors may be defrauded, are always regarded jealously by
Husband

and Wife,

the law; consequently it was held in Perkins v.

McCulloughi 49 Pac. (Oregon) 861, that where a

Fraudulent woman testified that property owned previously
Conveyance jointly had been divided orally between herself

and her husband, and the husband denied, the wife's evidetice
-- which would, if believed, result in a fraud on creditorsshould be disregarded.

In Donaldson v. Grant et al., 49 Pac. 779, the Supreme
Court of Utah held that a note payable in five years, a mortgage on certain real estate being given as collateral

security, which provided that
"if default be made
ta
a Promissory in the payment of any of the interest after it beIndepedent

Promises in

Note

comes due, or failure to comply with any of the

Affecting Itscodtn
Negotiability conditions or agreements contained in the mort-

gage given herewith, then said principal sum, with
the accrued interest thereon, shall, at the option of the holder,
become due and payable," was unnegotiable, as the mortgage
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contained covenants for the payment of taxes, assessments and
insurances, and that, therefore, it was not a promise to pay a
certain specified sum.
The correctness of this decision cannot be questioned. See
Smithv. Nightingale, 2 Starkie, 375 (1818).
The Supreme Court of New York has decided where a
verbal arrangement has been made to rent premises for a period
&andlordand of thirteen months at a rent payable monthly, and
Teaant,
the lessee executes a written lease, enters and pays
Parol L
monthly, but the lease is not signed by the lessor
until several months after possession has been taken by the
lessee, and subsequent to a time when the lessee, having given
,one month's notice to the agent of the lessor of his intention
to leave the premises, has moved out, that as the lease was
not executed by the landlord there was no legal obligation
-created under it, that being a parol lease for more than one
year it could not be sustained, and that the lessee was simply
a tenant from month to month, and therefore could leave the
premises after one month's notice: Lawrence v. Hasbrouck, 46
N. Y. Suppl. 868.
A provision in a lease was to the effect that the lessee would
permit the lessor to " enter said premises at all reasonable
Reservation hours to examine or make such repairs or alteraof Right
tions therein as shall be necessary, or as he may
of Re-entry
consider necessary, for the preservation or improvement thereof" It was held by the court that such provision must be construed together as a whole, and that it
would not justify a lessor in entering and building two additional stories upon the top of the leased premises in which he
carried on a rival business. A temporary injunction obtained
in the case by the lessee having been subsequently vacated
upon the lessor giving bond to cover damages resulting to the
lessee by reason of the alteration, it was held on final hearing
that while the lessor had no right to build the additional
stories, the proper relief to be given to the lessee was not to
compel a destruction of the stories already erected, but to
award damages for his actual loss consequent upon the building, and to issue an injunction restraining the lessor from
carrying on the rival business: Hessler v. Schafer, 46 N. Y.
Suppl. 1076.
In

-utkoffv. kMage (1897), 46 N. Y. Supp. 905, the City
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-Court of New York has laid -down the rule "that where a
Lialblity of party is induced to sign a negotiablfe instrument
Maker of Note by reason- of fraud, artifice or deception: practiced
to Bona Fde
for upon him by another as -to -the nature of the in,Purchaser
Value
strument, and .the maker signs the same innoUpon a Note
Procured by
Fraud

cently, under the belief that it was a contract of
another character, there can be no recovery upon
the note, although the holder may be an innocent

-purchaser for value before maturity, unless the maker was
guilty of laches or carelessness in omitting to read the same,
Or by some other means ascertaining the true nature and import of the instrument."
The lease of a farm was made by one Parish, in i888, to
last during the lifetime of himself and wife, and reserving a
Lease for Life, certain rent payable quarterly to him for-life, and
constitu.
after his death to his widow. The lessor died in
tional
1889, and by his will left the premises in question
-construction to the plaintiff, the lessor's
widow being living at
the time. The plaintiff brought an action of ejectment against
the tenant in possession on the ground that the lease was void
under the Constitution of the State of New York, article I,
-section 13, which provided "no lease or grant of agricultural
land for a longer period than twelve years hereafter made, in
which shall be reserved any rent or service of any kind shall
be valid." In the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York, Judges Green, Ward, and Hardin held that the
constitutional prohibition did not. render the lease for life void
-ab initio; that the-Constitution must be strictly construed according to its terms, and, as it had not in terms included leases
-for life in the prohibition, it would not be proper to so include
them, although the same reasons for the prohibition might
-exist as existed in the cases of leases for more than twelve
years.
The provision of the Constitution must be construed as
simply a limitation upon the duration of a lease for life, which
may determine within that period, and is not one which annuls
-the instrument by which such lease is created. The court
-also called attention to the analogy between this interpretation
and the construction of that section of the Statute of Frauds,
-declaring certain contracts void which are not to be performed
-within one year. See Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 56o; Peters v.
Westborough, i9 Pickering, 364. Judges Follett and Adams
,dssented on the ground that the spirit and purpose of the
Constitution covered the case of leases for life as well as for a
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term of years. It would seem that the sounder view is that
adopted by the majority of the court in holding that a written
instrument, such as the Constitution of a State, should be
strictly construed, and that it is fair to presume if there had
been any intention to make such a radical change in the existing law as the prohibition of the creation of lease for life, it
would have been distinctly and carefully set forth: Parh v.
Roger, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 1058.
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a resident of Vermont, was divorced. in December,
1895; that on June 13, 1896, he went to New
Hampshire, and there married Grace Holsington,
a resident of Vermont, their intent being to evade
the laws of Vermont, which prohibited Coburn, as a divorced
person, from remarrying. The defence here is that this marriage was unlawfuL A conviction, however, was sustained, the
court holding that the validity of the marriage was to be determined by the laws of New Hampshire, there being nothing
in the Vermont Statute to the contrary: Brook v. Brook, 9
H. L. C. 193 (186I), is sharply criticised.

.Marriage and
Divorce,
Conflict of
Laws

The Supreme Court of Tennessee has recently decided that
where a married women made a will at a time when she had
no testamentary capacity under the Statutes of the
Married
Women,
State, the fact that she retained such paper for
*restamentary over twenty years after the passage of a Statute of
Capacity
Tennessee, giving a married woman power to
make a will, and often referred to the paper as her will, was
not sufficient to render the instrument in question a valid will.
The statute was not retroactive, and the instrument was not
republished in any of the ways recognized by law after the
passage of the statute giving testamentary capacity to married
women. It was further held that a section in the Tennessee
Code to the effect that "a will shall be construed, in reference
to the real and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and
take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the
death of the testator," referred simply to the quantum and
nature of the property devised by the will, and could not
validate a will invalid at the time of its execution : Mitchell v.
Kimbrought, 41 S. W. Rep. 993. The latter part of the decision accords with the view of the Pennsylvania courts in the
interpretation of a similar statute. See Neale's Appeal, lO4
Pa. St. 215 (1883); Carl'sAppeal, io6 Pa. St. 635 (1884);
Quin's Estate, 144 Pa. St. 444 (1891); Miller's Estate, 145
Pa. St. 561 (189i).
The ordinary contract of employment stipulating for monthly
wages is in the eye of the law a contract from month to month
and terminable by either party upon a month's
Master and
Servant,
notice; this principle was applied in Tennessee
Contract of
Coal-Iron Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 81. Fed. 814, to
Service
the case of an injured employe, and it was there
held that the fact that part of the inducement to the company
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was that it might be liable for damages if it did not make the
contract, did not convert the contract from a monthly to a life
contract. Pardee, C. J., dissented.
In Coleman v. United States, 8I Fed. 824, it is held that
one who works more than eight hours a day for the United
Eight Hour States without protest has no right of action
Law
against the government for the extra time. Rev.
Stat. 83,738, fixing eight hours as a day's labor being contrasted with mail carrier's Act of May 24, 1888, expressly conferring extra pay for extra time.
Kaiser v. McLean, 46 N. Y. Supp. 1038, admits the old
rule that a master is liable for the work of his agent only
Scope of
within the scope of his employment, but presents
Employment a rather doubtful application of the rule in deciding
that the master who employs an agent to keep lighted and
protected the lamps on a public street is not liable for injury
done to a boy by the agent who was chasing him off with perhaps unnecessary severity.
Fariss v. Deming Investment Co., 49 Pac. (Okl.) 926, illustrates an important principle of law with respect to obtaining
Mortgage, title to land in new and unsettled countries. In a
Validity of proceeding to foreclose a mortgage an answer was
Land Patent held invalid upon demurrer which set up that a
patent had not been issued by the government at the date of
the mortgage, the court holding that as soon as a person was
(by § 4 of Homestead Act, 12 Stat. 1393) entitled to a patent
he may deal with the land precisely as if the patent had issued.
Tn Schroederv. Kinney, 49 Pac. (Utah) 894, Kinney, after
mortgaging his land to Derge, conveyed it to Owens, subject
Security for to the mortgage debt; when the notes for which
Debt
the mortgage was security fell due, the time for
payment was extended by Derge without Kinney's knowledge.
Held that as Kinney had become a surety for the payment of
the death by his sale to Owens, he was discharged from personal liability on the notes by the extension for payment given
without his consent.
In Rogers v. Barnes, 47 N. E. (Mass.,) 602, an interesting
and somewhat novel question was presented, viz., whether a
mortgagor can maintain an action and recover the
Power of
Sale
full value of his land against a mortgagee who
had sold the land under a power of sale contained in the
mortgage to -a bona fide purchaser for value. A majority of
the court, though conceding that the mortgagor could have
recovered the land from the purchaser, nevertheless held that
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he could recover its value from the mortgagee, the court
likening the case to that of an unlawful conversion of pledged
goods; three judges dissented, taking especial exception to
the analogy.
The case of the Fla. Cent. & Penin. R. R. Co. v. Osceola St.
& Sub. R. R. Co., 22 So. Rep. 692, raises a question as to the
,unicipalities, power of a municipality to surrender the control
Control of
of its streets to private parties. The Supreme
Streets
Court of Florida decided that the power of the
municipality to "regulate, improve, alter, extend, and open
streets, lanes, and avenues," did not render valid an ordinance
vesting in a street railway corporation an exclusive right to construct tracks on all the streets of the city as then laid out or that
might thereafter be laid out for a period of ten years. In
view of the franchise-grabbing propensities everywhere prevalent, a decision such as this is very welcome.
The Supreme Court of New York, in Wagner v. New York
Condensed Milk Co., 46 N. Y. Supp. 959, decided that one
who leaves his horse unhitched and unattended in
Negligence,
Unguarded
the street, and the horse starts forvard and injures
Horse
a bicycle, which has been left standing in the
roadway against the curb, a few feet away, is liable for the
injury, and whether the person leaving the bicycle there without ascertaining whether the horse was guarded, is guilty of
negligence, is a question of fact for the jury.
The Court of Appeals of New York has decided that where
a statute provided for a tax on bank stock, with the further
Payments, proviso that the tax should remain a lien thereon
Involuntary, till paid, a payment made by a holder of such
Quasi.
stock was an involuntary one, and the same could
Contracts
be recovered upon the statute's being declared unconstitutional: -- tna Ins. Co. v. Mayor of New York, 47
N. E. 593.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has decided that the
transferee of a promissory note, transferred after
maturity, takes the same subject to equities; and
Transfer of also that the fact that a note is payable to a probate

Promissory
Notes,

Overdue
Instrument,
Notice

judge, in his official capacity, is sufficient to put
on inquiry anyone to whom he tenders these notes
in a private capacity: Freeman v. Bailey, 27 S. E. 686.
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In the Circuit Court.of the United States, Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, the following ruling in practice was recently
Practice,

made: A trial had been commenced and some testi-

mony had been taken, when, by agreement of parties, a juror was withdrawn. A director of the company defendant, who had been examined at that unfinished
trial, was afterwards recalled for examination under a rule of
court which provided that "a rule may be entered by either
party to take the depositions of witnesses without regard to
the circumstance of their being ancient, infirm or going witnesses, stipulating eight days' notice to the adverse party."
Under advice of counsel the witness declined to answer. The
plaintiff moved for an order on the witness requiring him to
testify, under the eight-day rule, touching a certain agreement.
Dallas, Circuit Judge, stated that the above clause seemed to
have been derived from a rule of the courts of the State of
Pennsylvania, but its validity as prescribing a mode of procedure for this tribunal was attacked upon the ground that it
is in conflict with section 86I of the Revised Statutes. It
was not desirable to pass upon this broad question. It was
not pretended that any fact existed to bring the proposed examination within any of the specified exceptions of that section, which is in these words: "The mode of proof in the
trial of actions at common law shall be by oral testimony and
examination of witnesses in open court, except as hereinafter
provided." Under Exparte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713 (1884), the
motion was denied.
A motion for reargument was also denied: Shellabarger v.
Oliver, 64 Fed. 306 (1894), and Register Co. v. Leland, 77
Fed. 242 (1896), were followed.
From this disposition of the question, it appears that the
Federat Court,
Depositions

Act of Congress of March 2, 1892, which enacts that it shall

be lawful to take the deposition or testimony of witnesses in
the mode prescribed by the laws of the state in which the
courts of the United States are held, does not extend the right
to take the testimony of a witness by deposition in advance of
trial, when no good reason exists for taking such testimony:
.Despauxv. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 81 Fed. Rep. 897.
The maker and indorsers of a promissory note having been
P'oissory
Notes,

Rights of
Indorsers

sued together, counter-claims successfully pleaded

by the former, enure to the benefit of the latter:
Wolf v. Michael, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 991. (Su-

preme Court.)
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A recent law of the State of Florida, providing for a State
Board of Examiners, who were to establish a uniform method
of legal examinations, has been declared unconPublic
stitutional, not on the ground that the admission
officers,
of attorneys is a matter solely for the discretion of
Boards of
the courts, as was intimated in Pennsylvania ,in
U.nhiners
Splane's Case, 123 Pa. 527 (1889), but since the Constitution
of Florida makes all public officers subject to election by the
people, or appointed by the governor. The act in question
directed the judges of the Supreme Court to appoint the
examiners: State v. Hocker (Supreme Court of Florida), 22
So. Rep. 721.
The Superior Court in Pennsylvania has recently been
obliged to apply the decision of the Supreme Court in what
ight to Pay cannot but be described as the unfortunate case of
Godclarlesv. Wigemnan, I13 Pa. 431 (1886). In
Laborers
that case it was held that the Act of 188 1, so far as
in Store
it prevented an employer from contracting with his
Orders
workmen to pay them in store orders, was unconstitutional.
Since this decision the Act of May 2o, i89I, P. L. 96, provides
that wages shall be paid semi-monthly in lawful money of the
United States. The plaintiff had paid in store orders, and
the question was whether this, in view of the later Act, was a
good defence. The Superior Court could do nothing else than
-follow the decision of the court of last resort. It is hoped
that the case will now be appealed, and the whole question of
the sacredness of the right of a workman to contract that
his wages be paid in store orders be reopened. The " storeorder system" has been described as the curse of the laborer.
Whatever the merits of the question, that is the feeling of the
laborer himself; and it was at his instance that the Act of
I88I was passed. Is not there something akin to solemn
mockery in a court setting aside arn act designed to do away
with a species of bondage, on the ground that it interferes
with the bondsman's right as a freeman to put himself in
bondage? Showalter v. Ehian, 5 Pa. Sup. 242.
The Supreme Court of Vermont has recently been called
upon to interpret a will where a testator, who, with his wife,
Rule Against was well advanced in years, and who had but one
Perpetuities child, a married woman, gave all his estate to his
wife for life, and after her death to his daughter for life, with
remainder to the heirs of her body, and should the daughter
"die, leaving no heirs of her body, or should I at any future
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time fail to have heirs of my body, then it is part of my will
and testament" that my property shall go to the Congregational Church, etc. The court held that the words " die,
leaving no heirs," imported that the time when the estate was
to pass to the church, if ever, was the death of the daughter,
and that the added words, "or should I at any future time
fail to have heirs of my body," were referable simply to the
death of the daughter, and that, therefore, the gift over to the
church did not violate the rule against perpetuities. This case
seems to go very far in considering the age and situation of
the testator in endeavoring to construe his language.: Well's
Estate, 38 Atlantic Reporter, 83.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Hixon v. Cupp, 49
Pac. Rep. 927, decided that it was the duty of the sheriff to
Sheriff,
Liability to
Protect

Prisoners in

protect the prisoners in his charge from unlawful

assaults upon such prisoners by others, also confined in the county jail; and in this case a sheriff
was held responsible in damages to a prisoner who

was thus assaulted, the sheriff having known
of
the contemplated assault, and not using every reasonable
means to prevent it.
There are some legal rights which cannot be surrendered
by any contract or agreement, and such was held to be the
Stockholder, statutory right of a stockholder in a building association to withdraw therefrom, after giving 30
Right of
Withdrawal days' notice (Rev. St. Mo., § 281o), in spite of an
express declaration in the certificates that there shall be no
right of withdrawal until one hundred months from the
issuance of the stock: Latimer v. Eq. Loan & Ins. Co. (Cir.
Ct. W. D. Mo.), 81 Fed. Rep. 776.
The Supreme Court of Oregon has rendered a decision on
one phase of the question on which there is such a great
Statutes.

conflict

of

authorities

in

the

United

States,

viz: whether the validity of a statute may be inquired into, and the presumption from due enrolment overthrown, by the journals of the legislature. In that
decision the court, following Currieov. Southern Pacific Co., 21
Ore. 566 (1891), and Statev. Rogers, 22 Ore. 348 (1892), holds
that, in order to impeach the validity of such statute, it must
affirmatively appear from the journals that it did not, in fact,
receive the approval of the constitutional number of members of the legislature; that mere silence of the journals is not
Inquiry into
Validity
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sufficient; hence an enrolled statute, signed by the proper
officers and filed in the office of the Secretary of State, will
be deemed to have been enacted as enrolled, though the journals show that in its progress through the legislature an
amendment was adopted which was not included in the enrolled act, the presumption being that the vote by which such
amendment was adopted was reconsidered and the amendment defeated: McKennon v. Cotner et at. (American Fire Insurance of Phila., garnishee), 49 Pac. Rep. 956.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has gone a step further holding that the rule that mere silence of the journals to show
Legislative
that a certain thing was done does not prove that
Journals
it was not done, is not the law in Idaho, but that
the journals of the legislature are not only the best evidence,
but the exclusive evidence of what was done by the legislature, and the courts must impute to the record and statements
in the journals absolute verity, and that the failure of the
journals to show that any constitutional requirement was
obeyed is conclusive evidence that such requirement was not
obeyed: Colen v. iKingsley, 49 Pac. Rep. 985.
The Supreme Court of California has again decided that,
notwithstanding the general rule that the law does not take
Approval and cognizance of fractions of a day, the court may,
Operation
when substantial justice requires it, ascertain the
precise hour when a statute took effect; and that in determining the question no account is taken of the time it received the
sanction of the two branches of the legislative department,
but what must be looked to is the precise hour of the day
when the statute received the executive approval: Davis v.
Whdden, 49 Pac. Rep. 766.
The construction of a statute involving the meaning of
words used .therein is a question of law. If there is no
statutory definition and the words are not of
Statutory
Construction, common import, or have a technical meaning, or
Mleaning of are terms of art or science, the judge in conTechnical
struing them may refer to persons who have
knowledge upon the subject, or he
may consult
documents or books of reference; in fact may take such
means as he deems advisable to inform himself: State v.
Stevens (Supreme Court of Va.), 38 Atl. Rep. 8o.
A surety is, of course, relieved from liability by a change
in the contract made without his consent. So in Yohn v.
Suretyship Shoemaker,
5 who
Pa. Super.
Ct. 320i
it was held
that a suretyhad signed
a judgment
.note
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under the agreement that it was to be filled up, payable at six
months, was relieved from liability to creditor who made it
payable at once; also, held, that surety is relieved from liability by failure of creditor to obtain signature of principal.
This is an implied condition of a contract of suretyship.
One of several co-tenants, against whom all taxes were
assessed while he and the assessor both supposed
Tenants In
Common,
that he was the sole owner of the land, is not
Contribution, entitled in a partition suit to any reimbursement
Taxes
for the payment of such assessments: O'Harav.
Quinn, (Supreme Court of Rhode Island,) 38 Atl. Rep. 7.
In a recent case the Supreme Court of New York held
that a bequest to a voluntary unincorporated association for a
charitable purpose was void, on the ground that
Trustfor
Unincorpor- the association had no legal capacity to receive
ated Charities the bequest.
This decision is in accordance with
and follows the earlier New York cases: Owens v. Society, 14
N. Y. 380 (1856); Downing v. Marshall,23 N.Y. 366 (I86I);
Sherwood v. Society, 40 N. Y. 56i (1869), which decide that
the law of charitable uses, as it existed in England at the time
of the Revolution, is not in force in New York, and that
neither the Statute of 43 Elizabeth nor its principles are in
force, and that trusts for charities must be treated as any ordinary trusts.
In the same case, following the decision of Fosdick v. Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 58I, it was held that a bequest of $iooo to
the poor of St. Peter's Roman Catholic Church in Barclay
street was void; that, while the church was incorporated, the
bequest was not to them ; and, even if there had been a trustee
competent to take, the bequest to the poor of the parish was
void for indefiniteness: Pratt v. Orphans' Asylum, 46 N. Y.

Suppl. 1035.

A trial judge cannot, in an action of tort, and on motion of
the successful party, set aside a verdict as being "against the
Verdict,
evidence," because, in his opinion, the amount of
Setting Aside damages recovered is inadequate; nor can he set
it aside on the ground of inadequacy unless it appear to be
the result of passion, prejudice, corruption, unaccountable
caprice, or other improper influence; Jenkins v. Hawkins
(Supreme Court of Tennessee), 41 S. W. Rep. 1028.
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In two recent cases in the Chancery Division of England,
one before Kekewich, J., Zfn re Parker,[1897] 2 Ch. 208, and
the other before Romer, J., In re Walker, [1897]
Wills,
Construction 2 Ch. 238, words importing legitimate descendants have 'been held to include illegitimates,
of Words,
illegitimates because of the language of the will.
In the
former of these cases, an illegitimate riephew was held entitled
to share in a bequest to the "nephews and nieces" of the
testator's wife, because the testator had previously spoken of
him as his wife's "nephew;" and in the latter, an illegitimate
daughter of a niece was allowed to share in a bequest to the
"'issue" of nephews and nieces, since the testatrix had else-where spoken of her as "my great-niece."
On an indictment for larceny the prisoner became a witness
on his own behalf, Held improper for the prosecuting attorney to ask him whether he had not
CrossExamination, been expelled from church membership, and
Testifying on whether he had not been disbarred upon charges
preferred by a bar association, .accusing him of
Own Behalf
Witness,

larcenies other than the one in question.: _People v. Dorthy
(Supreme Court), 46 N. Y. Suppl. 970.

